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The topic editors, Cornelia Herbert and
colleagues, have noted that language has
historically been assumed to be inde-
pendent from emotions. The historical
backdrop to this is the long reign of
faculty psychology, which viewed the
human mind as composed of discrete
abilities (see discussion in Barrett, 2013).
The mental modularity popularized by
Chomsky (1965) and Fodor (1983) con-
tinued this view following the cognitive
revolution of mid-century. Emotion
had no role in information process-
ing psychology, leading to its neglect in
the cognitive sciences (Cromwell and
Panksepp, 2011). Indeed, the classic
emotion-cognition divide has been crit-
icized in the past decades by theorists
who are otherwise not natural allies (e.g.,
Damasio, 1994; Cromwell and Panksepp,
2011; Lindquist, 2013). An alternative
to faculty psychology is psychological
construction (Lindquist, 2013). On this
view, mental abilities and mental states
like emotions are constructed from the
dynamic interaction of physiological
states, situation-specific information, and
conceptual knowledge.
In the modular view of mind, emotion
and language should have little overlap
in their processes and representations.
However, according to psychological con-
structivism, an emotional reaction can
be influenced by any aspect of the on-
going situation, such as the language
being spoken, which is the topic of this
commentary.
I describe here findings on the
emotionality differences between a
native and a foreign language. Bilingual
speakers 1 frequently report that swear-
ing, praying, lying, and saying I love
you feel differently when using a native
rather than a foreign language (see,
e.g., Pavlenko, 2005; Dewaele, 2010).
My goal is to highlight the relevance
of this body of work for the theoretical
assumptions regarding language-emotion
independence.
WHEN ANDWHY IS A FIRST
LANGUAGE MORE EMOTIONAL?
An emotionality advantage for native lan-
guages has been documented using diverse
techniques, as recently discussed in a com-
prehensive review paper (Pavlenko, 2012).
For example, in a European study using a
variety of L1-L2 pairings, advertising slo-
gans were judged to be more emotional
when the messages were written in the
native language rather than respondents’
L2 (Puntoni et al., 2009). Anooshian and
Hertel (1994) found emotion-memory
effects for L1 but not L2 words, among
Spanish-English bilinguals.
Reduced emotionality in the L2 has
also been found in studies that use
emotion words to interfere with pro-
cessing. Colbeck and Bowers (2012)
compared emotion word processing in
1To be as inclusive as possible, I follow the common
practice of identifying bilingualism as either having
good proficiency in more than one language, or of
regularly using more regularly using more than one
language, regardless of proficiency. The first language
(L1) is defined to be the chronologically first acquired
language, with “second language” meaning a language
acquired after the L1 (see Dewaele, 2010). A foreign
language is a language acquired primarily via class-
room learning, and not a language spoken in the
learners’ community.
native Chinese speakers and native English
speakers using an English attentional-
blink task. The native English speak-
ers showed a strong blink following a
taboo distractor, while Chinese speakers
of English as a second language showed
a blink that was reduced in size, consis-
tent with being able to more easily ignore
the taboo distractor. Other examples of
improved performance because of reduced
L2 emotionality have been found using
decision making tasks. In two studies by
different research teams, bilingual speak-
ers made slightly more rational decisions
when evaluating vignettes written in a for-
eign language (Keysar et al., 2012; Costa
et al., 2014; see also findings about moral
dilemmas, Costa et al., 2014).
Laboratory studies measuring skin con-
ductance amplitudes have corroborated
these findings (Harris et al., 2003). An
important qualification was obtained by
studying early, sequential bilinguals, who
learned Spanish first from their parents
and English second from peers and school-
ing in American society (Harris et al.,
2006). For these bilinguals, their first lan-
guage was not their most proficient lan-
guage. They had similar electrodermal
responses for emotional phrases in their
two languages. One implication (which
needs additional empirical support) is that
both early age of acquisition and high
proficiency are required to show an emo-
tionality advantage. That is, if only age of
acquisition were sufficient to show height-
ened electodermal responses, then the her-
itage language learners should have shown
stronger emotions to Spanish phrases.
If only proficiency mattered, then this
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group should have shown stronger emo-
tionality responses to L2-English. A com-
parison group of bilinguals for whom
L1-Spanish was both the first learned and
most proficient language revealed higher
skin conductance responses for childhood
reprimands in L1 than in L2. This sug-
gests that L1/L2 emotionality differences
are strongest when L1 is the native lan-
guage and L2 is a less proficient, foreign
language.
In addition to early age of acqui-
sition and high proficiency, emotional
resonances are stronger when language
is learned via immersion, rather than
from classroom learning (Dewaele, 2010).
Another important factor is high usage
frequency (Degner et al., 2011). In the
broader literature on L1/L2 effects, these
four factors are linked in reciprocal, causal
relationships, and indeed, are important
for determining individual differences in
bilingual experiences and abilities. Early
age of acquisition typically results in
high proficiency; high proficiency usually
leads to frequent use. Frequency of use
improves proficiency; immersive learning
leads to higher frequency of use and better
proficiency.
Note that there have been inconsis-
tences in laboratory tasks of L1/L2 emo-
tionality differences. Several studies have
failed to replicate Anooshian and Hertel’s
emotion-memory effects, with Ferré et al.
(2010) reporting no recall effects as a func-
tion of L1/L2 status (see also Ayçiçegi-
Dinn and Caldwell-Harris, 2009). Similar
interference was found for L1 and L2 on
an emotional Stroop task (Eilola et al.,
2007). When Eilola and Havelka (2011)
recorded skin conductance during a taboo
Stroop task, they found similar interfer-
ence effects of the taboo words in L1/L2,
but L1 taboo words nevertheless elicited
larger autonomic responses than did L2
taboo words.
CAUSES: WHY ARE EMOTIONAL
RESONANCES STRONGEST WHEN A
LANGUAGE IS ACQUIRED EARLY AND
LEARNED TO HIGH PROFICIENCY?
Intuitively, it makes sense that a language
learned in childhood will carry strong
emotional resonances. The family context
of learning means that everyday language
carries the full range of human emotions.
A mechanism for connecting the physical
experience of emotion with specific
phrases and words is amygdala-mediated
learning. Early language develops at the
same time as emotional regulation systems
(Bloom and Beckwith, 1989). It is thus
plausible that utterances that are learned
early become tightly connected with the
brain’s emotional system. However, second
languages can also come to feel emotional,
if they are used frequently and are learned
via immersion rather than in the class-
room (Dewaele, 2010; Degner et al., 2011).
This is why I proposed that the primary
causal factor is the context in which a lan-
guage is learned and used (Harris et al.,
2006). Words and phrases come to have
a distinctive emotional feel by virtue of
being learned, or habitually used, in a
specific emotional context.
My theoretical proposal is that using
a language in emotional contexts pro-
vides it with emotional resonances because
human experiences are learned and stored
in a context-dependent manner. This view
is consistent with episodic trace theories
of memory (Hintzman, 1986), encoding
specificity (Tulving and Thompson, 1973),
language-specific autobiographic recall
of memory (Marian and Kaushanskaya,
2004, 2008), and psychological construc-
tivism broadly construed (Lindquist,
2013). With context-dependent learning,
distributional analysis sorts out, via expo-
sure to many examples, which aspects of
the overall meaning most frequently co-
occur with specific words and phrases
(e.g., McClelland et al., 1986). An alter-
native view is that frequency of use is
what matters rather than contexts of use
(e.g., Puntoni et al., 2009; Degner et al.,
2011). I suspect the frequency view and
the contexts of learning view are actually
highly similar perspectives and make dif-
ferent predictions only in rare cases. My
reasoning is that frequent usage entails
emotional usage. Human social lives,
which are mediated by communication,
are highly emotional. If there are situations
of frequent use of an L2 in low-emotion
environment, then my theory predicts that
these L2 users will experience their L2 as
low in emotional resonances.
One of the strengths of the “emo-
tional contexts of learning” hypothesis is
that it accommodates the idiosyncratic
learning histories of individual speakers.
In a group study on emotional word
processing, a word such as snake will elicit
different emotional reactions depending
on individuals’ personalities, experiences
with snakes and cultural backgrounds.
An implication is that we can have two
(complementary) ways of studying L1/L2
emotionality effects. We can take aver-
age responses across a group of bilingual
speakers, by examining language that most
people find emotional, such as parents
scolding children (childhood reprimands),
peers insulting each other (insults), or
people expressing love, praise, apprecia-
tion (endearments). When my colleagues
and I used these categories of emotional
expressions, we thus studied common sit-
uations where these phrases are learned
and used (Harris et al., 2006). But in these
studies, individual experiences that deviate
from group trends are ignored and treated
as noise.
A second method is to interview peo-
ple about their idiosyncratic experiences.
What specific phrases did your parents say
to you? How did authority figures speak
to you as a young adult? What did a
romantic partner tell you that you appre-
ciated? The prediction is that emotional-
ity will be greater for the language that
was used and/or learned in these situa-
tions. Although this interview technique
has not yet been used, immigration nar-
ratives revealed that emotional language
varies with individual experiences (Marian
and Kaushanskaya, 2008).
THEORETICAL IMPLICATION:
VOCABULARY AND GRAMMAR ARE
NOT CONTEXT-INDEPENDENT
To move beyond behaviorists’ focus on
imitation as the main route to learning,
Chomsky (1965) and theorists of the mid-
20th century emphasized that linguistic
expressions are primarily a result of apply-
ing abstract rules. They characterized lan-
guage as a parsimonious symbol system,
a type of mental algebra. The language
learner had to strip away words’ context
to construct context-independent vocabu-
lary. Learners must ignore extra-linguistic
aspects of sentences in order to construct
an abstract grammar.
The Chomskyan theoretical view dove-
tailed with the intuition that many people
have, which is that words are containers
for meanings. Reddy (1979) has labeled
this the conduit metaphor, referring to the
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belief that language, phrases and sentences
are the containers for speakers’ meanings
and thoughts. These containers are then
sent to conversation partners, who extract
and thus possess the meaning. Examples
provided by Reddy include the common
request to “put your feelings into words.”
An inference from the conduit
metaphor is that, as long as two phrases
are translation equivalents, they should
deliver the samemeaning. However, “same
meaning” is itself open to interpretation.
Consider the case where an English native
speaker has learned French in a class-
room context. When hearing Je t’aime, the
phrase doesn’t deliver the same emotional
punch as I love you (as documented by
Dewaele’s study of multilingual speakers’
report of I love you expressions; see also
Caldwell-Harris et al., 2013). If “extracting
and possessing the meaning” includes the
totality of mental states that form as a reac-
tion to hearing a phrase, then the I love you
examples (and other emotionality effects)
falsify the conduit metaphor. However, the
Chomskyan tradition has generally advo-
cated a narrow view of meaning, confining
it to the sense of words, not their richer
connotations. If the meaning of words is
confined to what is involved in identifying
translation equivalents, then the conduit
metaphor can be preserved.
One reason to retain the conduit
metaphor (and the narrow definition of
meaning) is if the conduit metaphor is the
only way we have of understanding how
symbols convey information. But other
conceptions are present in the research
literature and in everyday use. Reddy’s
(1979) description of how language actu-
ally works to provide meaning is called the
toolmaker paradigm. Words and phrases
are not containers of meaning, but clues
that hearers’ use to infer speakers’ com-
municative intent. On this view, Je t’aime
doesn’t deliver the same emotional punch
to the classroom French learner as I love
you, because the phrase isn’t a container
for the feeling expressed by I love you.
It’s a tool speakers use to guide hear-
ers to an interpretation. In the case of
foreign language learners, L2 phrases are
imperfect tools for activating themeanings
that would automatically be elicited by the
same phrase in a native language.
An advantage of discussing the rele-
vance of emotionality differences to the
conduit metaphor is that the conduit
metaphor and objections to it are a bit
abstract. L1-L2 emotionality differences
lend concreteness to Reddy’s classic cri-
tique of the container metaphor.
These arguments in turn have their the-
oretical implications, including how con-
text is represented. A second theoretical
implication of L1/L2 emotionality effects
is that words and phrases gain meaning
from sensorimotor and emotional embod-
iment. Both of these are discussed further
in Caldwell-Harris (2014).
CONCLUSIONS
Beyond the theoretical implications,
understanding L1/L2 emotionality effects
is important for bilinguals who may
wonder why these effects exist, or may
wonder why these effect don’t exist for
them. Emotionality effects are relevant
for monolingual speakers whenever they
interact with bilinguals who are using the
language that for them is later-learned
or less-proficient. And finally, they are
important because they challenge us to
confirm, refute, or extend our theories
about the relationship between language
and emotion.
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